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Daiker: Professional Malpractice: Defining a Professional Under the Statu

CASE COMMENTS
PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE: DEFINING A
PROFESSIONAL UNDER THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS* **
Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d 1273, 1274 (Fla. 1992)
Petitioner filed a malpractice action which alleged that respondent
had performed a negligent land survey.' Petitioner commenced the
action more than two years after discovering the error.2 At trial,
Respondent raised Florida's two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice as an affirmative defense.3 The trial court found
that the professional malpractice statute of limitations applied to
petitioner's action and had expired. 4 As a result, the trial court issued
a final summary judgment in favor of Respondent.5 The First District
Court of Appeal affirmed, but expressed difficulty in interpreting the
way prior case law defined who is a "professional" under the professional malpractice statute.6 The district court then certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: "For the purposes of [the]
professional malpractice statute is a land surveyor a professional?"
The Florida Supreme Court remanded to the trial court, and HELD,
a land surveyor is not a professional under the professional malpractice
statute of limitations.

*EditorsNote: This case comment received the George W. Milam Outstanding Case Comment
Award for Fall 1992.
**I would like to dedicate this comment to my wife, Teresa Daiker, and my parents, Yettie
Daiker and David Daiker, for their love and support.
1. Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d 1273, 1274 (Fla. 1992).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Garden v. Frier, 580 So. 2d 873, 874 (1st DCA 1991), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1992).
6. Id. The district court expressed concern over its interpretation of Pierce v. AALL Ins.
Co., 531 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1988), and stated that it was not clear that the Florida Supreme Court
would agree with its decision. Garden, 580 So. 2d at 874.
7. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1274 (alteration in original). The court had jurisdiction pursuant
to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4). Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1274.
8. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1277. The decision was per curiam. Id. at 1274. Chief Justice
Barkett concurred specially with an opinion in which Justice Kogan concurred. Id. at 1277
(Barkett, J., concurring). Justice Kogan also filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. (Kogan,
J., concurring).
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Prior to 1974, Florida did not have a statute of limitations for
malpractice.9 Interpreting section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes,
Florida courts grouped malpractice cases under either the three-year
limitation for contract actions 1o or the four-year limitation for actions
not specifically named in the statute." In 1971, the Florida Legislature
substantially rewrote section 95.11 and provided for a two-year statute
of limitations for medical malpractice. 12 In 1975, the legislature established a separate statute of limitations for professional malpractice
13
other than medical malpractice.
The legislature, however, did not define the term "professional"
4
for purposes of the professional malpractice statute of limitations.1
This legislative ambiguity led to confusion among the Florida courts. 5
For example, the Fourth District Court of Appeal and the Fifth District Court of Appeal issued conflicting decisions as to whether a land
surveyor was a professional under the statute of limitations.16
The Fourth District Court of Appeal first addressed the issue of
whether a land surveyor was a professional in Toledo Park Homes v.
Grant.17 Appellant filed suit against appellee, a registered land surveyor, alleging professional malpractice in preparing a survey. s The
court held that a land surveyor was not a professional, 9 explicitly
9. See Manning v. Serrano, 97 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1957) (holding the period of limitation
applicable to a malpractice action depends on the type of claim stated by plaintiff).
10. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(5)(e) (1973). The three-year statute of limitations also applied to
actions for trespass, conversion, and fraud. Id.

11.

FLA. STAT.

§ 95.11(4) (1973).

12. Act of 1971, 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-254, § 1. Although this amendment did not use the
term "medical malpractice," it applied to "an action to recover damages for injuries to the person
arising from any medical, dental, optometric, podiatric or chiropractic treatment or surgical
operation .. " Id.
13. Act of 1975, 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-9, § 7. As amended, the statute provided for a
two-year limitation for "[a]n action for professional malpractice ... whether founded on contract
or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is
discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." FLA. STAT. §
95.11(4)(a) (1975). Medical malpractice was specifically addressed in FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b)
(1975).
14. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1274-75.
15. Id. at 1275.
16. See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
17. 447 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
18. Id. at 344. One sketch of a survey did not disclose the existence of an encroachment
by an easement on a particular lot. Id.
19. Id. The court based its decision on Lund v. Cook, 354 So. 2d 940 (1st DCA), cert.
denied, 360 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1978). Lund does not provide any analysis as to why a land
surveyor is iot a professional. See id. In fact, the parties stipulated that the four-year statute
of limitations was controlling. Id. at 941. The actual holding of Lund concerns the time at which
a cause of action accrues and thereby starts the running of the applicable statute of limitations.
Id. at 942.
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rejecting appellee's argument that every occupation regulated by the
Florida Department of Professional Regulation should be considered
a profession.m° The court stated that the appellee's proposed rule would
expand the definition of "profession" to include many vocations that
the legislature never intended to consider as professions.21
In contrast, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Cristich v. Allen
Engineering,Inc.22 concluded that a land surveyor was a professional.2
In Cristich,appellants filed an action against appellee, a land surveyor,
for professional malpractice in the preparation of a survey.? The court
held that a land surveyor was a professional because surveying involved a professional act.?m In reaching its decision, the court focused
on the high degree of specialized knowledge required to perform land
surveys.?6
The Florida Supreme Court first addressed the definition of "professional" in Pierce v. AALL Insurance,Inc.2 In Pierce, an uninsured
motorist injured petitioner in an automobile accident.2 After discovering his insurance company sold him auto insurance without uninsured
motorist coverage, petitioner sued his insurance company for negligence and misrepresentation.2 However, petitioner had not fied his
lawsuit within two years of the drafting of the policy, and the respondent raised the professional malpractice statute of limitations as a
defense,1° The court held that an insurance agent was not a professional

20. Toledo Park Homes, 447 So. 2d at 344.
21. Id. The court states that such a rule would extend professional status to activities such
as embalming and cosmetology. Id.
22. 458 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
23: Id. at 79.
24. Id. at 77. The appellee prepared a survey of an apartment complex that contained
errors in the dimensions, size, and volume of the apartment units. Id.
25. Id. at 79.
26. Id. The court noted that land surveying required specialized skill and knowledge in the
fields of mathematics, geography, and the physical sciences. Id. To be licensed in Florida, a
surveyor must have either a four-year degree and two years experience under a professional
land surveyor, or at least eight years experience under a professional land surveyor. Id.
27. 531 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1988).
28. See id. at 85.
29. Id. Petitioner alleged that he had requested full uninsured motorist coverage and was
assured by respondent that he would have full coverage. Id. Petitioner also claimed that respondent negligently failed to inform him of his options for uninsured motorist coverage and failed
to obtain a written waiver of uninsured motorist coverage as required by FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1)
(1981). Pierce, 531 So. 2d at 85.
30. Pierce, 531 So. 2d at 85. Petitioner was injured in a traffic accident on November 1,
1982, but did not file suit until April 1985. Id.
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for purposes of the statute of limitations.31 The court defined a profession as a vocation requiring licensing under the laws of Florida and
academic preparation amounting to at least a four-year college degree
in a field of study related to the calling. 32 Because state law did not
require insurance agents to have a four-year degree to obtain a license,
the court held they were not professionals for the purpose of the

statute of limitations.3
The Florida Supreme Court did not address the definition of 'professional" again until the instant case.34 In the instant case, the court
clarified the Pierce decision by holding that a vocation is a profession
only if it requires at least a four-year degree before licensing.3 The
court explicitly receded from any language in Pierce suggesting that
absent a four-year degree, a combination of extensive preparation and
experience could suffice in some situations.3 6 The court held that a
vocation is not a profession if there is any way for a person to become
licensed without having a four-year degree.3 7 Therefore, a vocation
becomes a profession when the licensing body requires a four-year
degree for all potential licensees.3
The instant court also set out guidelines for applying its definition
of profession to different vocations. The instant case mandated analyzing each vocation as a whole, rather than analyzing the situation of
the individual in question3 9 As a result, a person who is licensed and

31. Id. at 88.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 87-88. The district court focused on the act of giving advice as a way to distinguish
professionals from non-professionals. Id. at 88. The Florida Supreme Court did not dispute that
insurance agents have specialized knowledge or that they give advice. Id. However, the court
found that without sufficient education, presumably a four-year degree, the giving of advice
was "hardly the act of a professional." Id.
34. The Florida Supreme Court addressed portions of its holding in Piercein Peat, Marwick,
& Mitchell Co. v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (Fla. 1990) (dealing with commencement of statute
of limitations period), but did not expand or clarify the definition of "professional."
35. Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 1992).
36. Id. This language came from the court's use of the phrase "academic preparation amounting to at least a four-year university level degree" in defining one of the characteristics of a
professional. Pierce, 531 So. 2d at 88. The court noted that the suggestion that the four-year
degree requirement could be met by training or preparation amounting to the equivalent of a
four-year degree caused confusion in interpreting Pierce. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1275.
37. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1276.
38. Id. This is true even though some members of the profession may not have a four-year
degree. Id. Those who were members before the requirement was imposed are grandfathered
in. Id. at n.4.
39. Id. at 1276.
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possesses a four-year degree is not necessarily a professional. 40 The
vocation must require the person to have a four-year degree before
the person will be considered a professional. 41 The instant case also
receded from the language in Pierce which suggested the four-year
degree must be in a field related to the profession.4 According to the
instant case, a vocation is a profession if state licensure requires at
least a four-year degree, regardless of the nature of the degree. 43 The
court also stated that even though some people can be licensed in
Florida because they hold a similar license in another state or country,
that fact is not relevant in determining if those people are professionals." The court did not want the definition of "professional" to hinge
on the licensing provisions of other jurisdictions. 45 Instead, the court
sought to create a clear definition of "professional" to promote fairness
and uniformity in licensing procedures.
Applying this clarified definition of a profession to the facts of the
instant case, the court held that a land surveyor was not a professional
for purposes of the statute of limitations. 46 The court reasoned that
it is possible under Florida law for a person to become a licensed land
surveyor without first obtaining a four-year degree. 47 Although obtaining a four-year degree is one way for a person to qualify for licensure
as a land surveyor, other alternatives exist which do not require a
four-year degree.48 Because some members of the vocation can be
licensed without a four-year degree, the instant court did not consider
land surveyors professionals for purposes of the statute of limitations.49
The court noted that its first inclination was to strike down the
statute on grounds of vagueness, because the legislature had not
defined 'profession."0 However, the court refrained from striking

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1275.
43. Id. Similarly, a vocation is a profession if state licensure requires a graduate degree,
regardless of the nature of the undergraduate degree. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1275-76.
46. Id. at 1277.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 472.013(2) (1991). The alternatives allow licensure for individuals
with less academic training, but more extensive experience. Id. For example, a land surveyor
can be licensed with only a high school education if he or she has eight years of experience
under a licensed land surveyor. Id. § 472.013(2)(e).
49. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1277.
50. Id. at 1275.
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down the statute because it viewed such action as being foreclosed
5 1 However, the court did invite the
by its earlier opinion in Pierce.
legislature to define "profession. ' 52 Justice Kogan expanded on this
theme in his concurrence and criticized the legislature for leaving the
definition of a profession to the judiciary.5 Justice Kogan stated that
the absence of any definition of "professional" in the statute rendered
it so vague as to be unconstitutional and unenforceable.5 Justice Kogan
also said that leaving the definition of the term to the courts violated
the doctrine of separation of powers under the Florida Constitution. ,
The instant case essentially clarifies the Florida Supreme Court's
earlier definition of "professional" set out in Pierce.- The*Pierce court's
opinion, rather than resolving the issues surrounding the definition of
a profession, created confusion in the lower courts. 57 Part of the lower
courts' confusion in interpreting Pierce resulted from the Florida Supreme Court's contradictory statements as to whether a four-year
degree was an absolute requirement of being a "professional," or
whether specialized knowledge and academic preparation deemed equivalent to a four-year degree was sufficient. Additionally, the Pierce
court misstated both Florida statutory law and Florida case law in its
reasoning. The court stated that a person cannot be licensed as a land

51. Id. The court expressed concern that striking down the statute for vagueness would
result in serious confusion. Id. It also would have the effect of overruling the legislative intent
implicit in the provision - to provide certain occupations classified as professions with additional
statutory protection. Id. Essentially, professionals would be subject to a four- or five-year
statute of limitations, rather than the two-year statute of limitations they enjoyed under the
statute. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1991).
52. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1275.
53. Id. at 1277 (Kogan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 1278 (Kogan, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 1277 (Kogan, J., concurring). Justice Kogan referred to article II, section 3 of
the Florida Constitution which states in part, "No person belonging to one branch [of government]
shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided
herein." FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. Justice Kogan seemed to be concerned that the court, in
defining the term "profession," was usurping authority belonging only to the legislative branch.
See Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1277 (Kogan, J., concurring).
56. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1275-76.
57. In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledges that the language in
Pierce caused some confusion in the lower courts. Id. at 1275.
58. Id. Compare Pierce,531 So. 2d 84 (suggesting that the equivalent of a four-year degree
would suffice as a qualification for a profession, but holding that a profession is a vocation
requiring a college degree in the specific field) with Panther Air Boat Corp. v. MacMillan-Buchanan & Kelly Ins. Agency, 531 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1988) (omitting any reference to training or
preparation amounting to a four-year college degree).
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surveyor in Florida without a four-year degree in the field. 59 The court
cited section 472.013(2) of the Florida Statutes and Cristich v. Allen
Engineering, Inc.6° as authority for that proposition. 61 However, the
statutes in question provided several alternatives that allow a person

to be licensed as a land surveyor without a four-year degree. 62 Similarly, the Cristich court acknowledged that alternatives to a four-year
degree existA3 These misstatements in the court's reasoning, along
with the court's apparent inconsistency in its definition of "professional," caused confusion among the lower courts which in turn led to
4
the court's review in the instant case.r

The instant court's clarification of the definition set out in Pierce
both expands and contracts the range of individuals receiving the

benefit of the shorter professional malpractice limitation. The new
definition expands the group of vocations covered by the statute by
eliminating the requirement that the four-year degree must be in a

field related to the vocation.c5 This change probably will result in more
vocations meeting the requirements for a profession. 6 Perhaps more
significantly, however, the change in the definition will now exclude
vocations that allow licensure of individuals who do not possess a
four-year degree. 67 For example, the instant case specifically excludes
land surveyors from the definition of '"professional" and thereby elimi-

59. Pierce, 531 So. 2d at 87.
60. 458 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 1974).
61. Pierce, 531 So. 2d at 87.
62. FLA. STAT. § 472.013(2) (1987). Subsections (c)through (e) of this section provide
alternatives to a four-year degree. Id. The stated alternatives require less academic preparation
for individuals with more experience in actual land surveying. Id. It is possible for an applicant
to be licensed as a land surveyor with only a high school education if the applicant also has
eight years experience as a subordinate to a licensed land surveyor. Id. § 472.013(2)(d).
63. Cristich, 458 So. 2d at 79. The court stated that a land surveyor must have a four-year
degree or at least eight years experience under a land surveyor. Id.
64. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1275.
65. Id.
66. This change essentially overrules portions of Security First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Broom, Cantrell, Moody & Johnson, 560 So. 2d 304, 307-08 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), and First
State Sav. Bank v. Albright & Assocs., Inc., 561 So. 2d 1326, 1330 (5th DOA 1990), rev. denied,
576 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1992), which held that members of the American Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers were not professionals because, although they were required to have a four-year
degree to qualify for state licensure, they were not required to have a four-year degree in a
field related to their profession. Since the instant case eliminates this requirement, members
of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers would now be considered professionals for
the purpose of the statute.
67. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1276.
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nates the considerable protection they previously enjoyed under the
two-year statute of limitations.68
Because the instant court fashioned its definition of "professional"
without any basis in statutory law, it is appropriate to examine the
possible public policy concerns underlying the instant court's decision. 69
It is difficult to understand why the presence or absence of a four-year
degree is a crucial factor in determining if a particular vocation is a
profession. Normally, when a statute fails to define words of common
usage, courts should interpret the words in accordance with their plain
and ordinary meaning. 7 A profession is commonly defined as a vocation
requiring specialized education and skill.7 1 This definition provides a
basic guideline that the instant court seems to follow.
However, in setting out a definition of "professional," the instant
court clearly chose to emphasize formal education over specialized
knowledge or skill. The court's definition expressly excludes people
who may have a high degree of specialized skill and knowledge if they
do not have a four-year degree as well.72 Yet, the court found a
four-year degree to be sufficient academic training even if it is not
related to the specific field of the profession.7 Under these circumstances, requiring a four-year degree does not necessarily support
the concern for specialized knowledge since the degree can be in a
field totally unrelated to the profession. Similarly, if the court was
concerned about specialized knowledge and skill, it would seem more
appropriate to allow experienced and knowledgeable people to be
licensed without the formality of a four-year degree. In short, the
Florida Supreme Court did not seem to have a clear public policy
reason for requiring a four-year degree. However, the court's requirement of a four-year degree furthered the court's goal of establishing

68. Id. at 1277. After this decision, actions against land surveyors will be subject to a fouror five-year statute of limitations, doubling the amount of time land surveyors are vulnerable
to suit. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1991).
69. In fact, Justice Kogan argues that the court's action in this case is a legislative rather
than a judicial function. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1277 (Kogan, J., concurring).
70. Pedersen v. Green, 105 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1958).
71. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1089-90 (5th ed. 1979).
72. The court rejects the idea that alternate forms of education, such as on-the-job experience over a long period of time, are sufficient qualifications for a professional. Garden, 602 So.
2d at 1275. Even people with eight years of experience as subordinates to licensed land surveyors
or ten years of land surveying experience in the military service of the United States are not
considered to be sufficiently trained to achieve professional status under the statute of limitations.
See id.
73. Id.
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a bright-line testJ. The instant court's test looks only to whether or
not the individual has a four-year degree, not whether the degree is
in a related field or whether other forms of preparation reach the
equivalent of a four-year degree.
The instant case also directs courts to analyze professions as a
whole, rather than looking at individual defendants.75 This analysis
may be unfair to some individuals because it groups a wide variety
of individuals into one category and labels them all as professionals
or non-professionals. For example, a land surveyor with a doctorate
degree in land surveying would not be a professional because of the
possibility that other land surveyors might not have four-year degrees. 76 A more accurate determination of who is a professional might
be made by analyzing each defendant individually, on a case-by-case
basis. Such an approach also would acknowledge the wide variety of
training and skill levels that can exist within a profession.
However, a court's application of an individual analysis would be
less efficient because the parties would have to litigate the issue in
each case. The instant court may have been attempting to pressure
certain vocations into upgrading their minimum requirements for licensure. Current members of a vocation requiring state licensure but not
a four-year degree will have a strong incentive to campaign for raising
the entry requirements, thus establishing a true profession complete
with the increased statutory protection.Y Requiring a four-year degree
of all new licensees would increase the over-all level of formal academic
training in the profession and benefit the consuming public as a whole.
Justice Kogan's view that the statute is unconstitutionally vague
also deserves discussion.7 8 The legislative history of the statute indicates that legislature intentionally left the judiciary to define
"professional" to avoid '%urt[ing] some people's feelings."79 If the
legislature refrained from defining the term in order to force an
unpopular decision onto the judiciary, such inaction strengthens the
argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The legislature

74. Id.
75. Id. at 1275-76.
76. Id.
77. A vocation will become a profession once the minimum requirements are imposed on
all future members. Id. at 1276. Those already in the vocation will be grandfathered in. Id. at
n.4. The court did not believe it would be fair for some members of a vocation to be considered
professionals while others were not. Id.
78. Id. at 1277 (Kogan, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 1275.
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is responsible for defining key terms in statutes, not the judiciary.
Of course, the majority points out that striking down the statute on
grounds of vagueness would have resulted in the loss of statutory
protection to all non-medical professionals.81 However, such an action
would have forced the legislature to deal with a question that Justice
Kogan contends is inherently legislative in nature. 2
The instant case has clarified the definition of "professional" for
the purposes of the statute of limitations, and has provided a brightline test. The new definition will expand the statute's protection to
additional vocations and withdraw its protection from others which
the statute had previously protected. Although the court has established a bright-line test, some doubt remains as to whether a four-year
degree is actually the distinguishing aspect of a profession. The court's
approach maximizes efficiency in determining who is a professional,
but at the cost of making generalized decisions that may not accurately
reflect the professional status of an individual. Most troubling, however, is the legislature's failure to define the term from the inception
of the statute. The legislature should examine the problem, weigh
the public policies involved, and correct the statute's built-in infirmity.
Duane A. Daiker

80. See id. at 1277 (Kogan, J., concurring); see also FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (describing
separation of powers among three branches of state government).
81. Garden, 602 So. 2d at 1275.
82. Id. at 1277-78 (Kogan, J., concurring).
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